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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DOES INFLATION TARGETING MATTER IN 
 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES? 
 
 
Acar, Ozan  
 
M.A., Department of Economics 
 
Superviser: Assoc. Prof. Kıvılcım Metin Özcan 
 
 
 
September, 2006 
 
 
 
 
After it was first adopted by the New Zealand in 1989, inflation targeting (IT) 
has became quite popular and several other countries have started to design their 
monetary policy strategies within the IT framework. In the literature, there are 
considerable amount of studies which discuss the underlying reasons of the 
popularity of IT and several of them come up with the conclusion that the increased 
macroeconomic performance of 1990s is attributable to the IT regime. In this thesis, 
we will try to discover the differing characteristics of the IT and non-IT countries in 
terms of their revealed aversion to inflation variability which is proposed in 
Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000) (CE). Furthermore, we will investigate whether the 
path followed by the inflation in the aftermath of a demand shock for IT and non-IT 
countries are different from each other. All measures which we will be analyzed in 
this thesis will be estimated from a semi-structural dynamic time series model using 
extended Kalman filtering techniques.     
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ÖZET 
 
SANAYİLEŞMİŞ ÜLKELERDE ENFLASYON  
HEDEFLEMESİ FARK YARATIYOR MU? 
 
Acar, Ozan 
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Kıvılcım Metin Özcan 
 
Eylül 2006 
 
 
İlk olarak Yeni Zelanda tarafından 1989 yılında uygulanmaya başlanan 
enflasyon hedeflemesi rejimi, bu yıldan sonra birçok ülke tarafından benimsenmiş ve 
bu ülkeler para politikalarını enflasyon hedeflemesi rejimi çerçevesinde 
şekillendirmeye başlamışlardır. Literatürde enflasyon hedeflemesine olan artan 
ilginin sebeplerini araştıran birçok çalışma mevcuttur. Bu çalışmalar içerisinde 
1990’lı yıllarda gözlenen makroekonomik performans artışını enflasyon hedeflemesi 
rejimi ile ilişkilendirenler vardır. Bu tezde enflasyon hedeflemesi yapan ve 
yapmayan ülkelerin enflasyondaki dalgalanmaya karşı duydukları isteksizlikte bir 
farklılık olup olmadığı sorusuna cevap aranacaktır. Enflasyondaki dalgalanmaya 
karşı duyulan isteksizlik Cecchetti ve Ehrmann (2000)’de (CE) ifade edildiği şekliyle 
hesaplanacaktır. Buna ek olarak, ekonomiyi vuran talep yönlü bir şokun enflasyon 
hedeflemesi yapan ve yapmayan ülkelerde enflasyonu nasıl etkilediği tartışılacaktır. 
Bu tezde analiz edilecek olan tüm değişkenler yarı yapısal dinamik bir zaman serisi 
modelinden, genişletilmiş Kalman filtresi tekniği kullanılarak tahmin edilecektir.  
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 CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
After price stability has come to be primary goal of the monetary authorities in the 
last decade, a dense literature has emerged in order to analyze the general 
characteristics of effective monetary policy to see whether this goal is achievable. As 
stated in many papers including Woodford (2004) and Faust et al (2004), such 
effectiveness depends on the extent to which the expectations of the public are 
reshaped by the policy announced or implemented. In that sense, following 
transparent monetary policies and having commitment technologies to anchor 
inflation expectations are considered as two important objectives, which central 
banks should pursue. 
 
Based on the above discussion, it is not surprising to see that most of the research in 
this field focuses on inflation-targeting regimes, in which transparency and 
commitment play dominant roles. As it is stated in Woodford (2004), the inflation 
targeting (IT) rule, ``a rule under which the central bank's commitment is defined by 
a target for certain variables at a certain distance in the future'', facilitates public 
understanding of the policy and thus has an effect on the expectations of the public. 
This type of a commitment to an announced target helps the public form more 
anchored expectations regarding the outcome that the policy is designed to influence. 
In addition to these characteristics, as stated in Bernanke et al. (1999), these regimes 
 2
can be considered as “constrained discretion”, where there is also room for 
stabilizing negative supply shocks as long as the long-run price stability objective is 
not distorted. 
  
After its first adoption by New Zealand on the second quarter of 1989, many other 
central banks, have implemented IT and none of them abandoned this regime with 
their own consent. All of these banks have realized the importance of transparency, 
commitment and constrained discretion in the policy making process. In fact, several 
empirical studies provide results that are in favor of these regimes. One common 
finding in Siklos (1999), Corbo et al (2001), Petursson (2004) and Levin et al (2004) 
is that inflation persistence has significantly decreased after the adoption of IT. In 
addition, Dittmar et al (1999), Johnson (2002, 2003), Gavin (2003), Petursson (2004) 
and Levin et al (2004) find that IT has played a significant role in anchoring and 
lowering inflation expectations. 
 
However, the success of IT regimes is criticized on a very important ground: As CE, 
Groenveld (1998) and Bernanke et al (1999) argue, the improvements in the inflation 
dynamics cannot be solely attributed to IT. CE show that, regardless of the 
implemented policy regime, the last decade witnessed a significant increase in 
inflation aversion. After deriving a measure from a pre-specified loss function of the 
central banks, they find evidence that there is not a significant difference between 
inflation targeters and their counterparts in terms of aversion to inflation. Also, 
Bernanke et al (1999) and Groenveld (1998) show that the implementation of IT does 
not exhibit any change in the actual inflation process. Consequently, while one strand 
of the literature provides evidence in favor of IT regimes, the other argues that the 
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success in fighting inflation is the result of an overall increase in the inflation 
aversion in the world economy and adds that achieving price stability does not 
necessarily depend on a particular monetary policy regime. 
  
This thesis takes the above discussion as its starting point and analyzes the 
differences between IT countries and their non-IT counterparts within a semi-
structural dynamic time series model. Consistent with a Phillips Curve specification, 
the model can be described as a system of equations where the inflation and output 
gap dynamics are analyzed within a time-varying parameter framework. Such an 
approach, which has not been followed in the IT literature before, can better capture 
the macroeconomic dynamics of the economy, which vary to a significant extent 
depending on different policy regimes. 
  
In particular, we extend the analysis on two grounds. First, we obtain two alternative 
measures of inflation aversion and investigate whether there is a significant 
difference between IT and non-IT countries. In other words, we investigate the same 
issue with CE within the context of a more dynamic framework. Our findings show 
that, similar to CE, there has been an increase in inflation aversion for both groups of 
countries. However, the results also show that, while the average value of the 
inflation aversion measure for IT countries was lower than the average value of their 
non-IT counterparts before implementing the regime, the situation is reversed after 
these economies adopted inflation targeting. More specifically, we find a statistically 
significant difference between the increases in the average values of the inflation 
aversions, in favor of the IT group. As a result, we can say that, in a macroeconomic 
framework, where the changing dynamics of the economy is accounted for, aversion 
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to inflation for the IT countries has increased significantly more than the aversion for 
the non-IT countries. 
  
Second, and more importantly, for the two sets of countries, we analyze the 
responses of inflation to output gap shocks that may disturb the price dynamics. Our 
reasoning for such an exercise is as follows: within an IT framework, commitment 
technologies induce monetary authorities to take pre-emptive actions and absorb the 
output gap shocks. In other words, bounded with a pre-announced inflation target, 
central banks follow more aggressive monetary policies to reduce any negative 
effects of output gap shocks on price stability. Furthermore, commitment 
mechanisms and transparency of the monetary policy may help to keep the inflation 
expectations in the economy within a certain band. Thus, augmented through the 
expectation mechanism, the reflection of the negative effects of the output gap 
shocks on inflation may be less in an IT framework. 
  
The findings from the above-mentioned exercise constitute the crux part of this 
thesis. We find that, after economies switch to IT, there is a significant decrease in 
the response of inflation to output gap shocks. In other words, IT ensures that price 
stability becomes less prone to output gap shocks. However, for the non-IT countries, 
we do not observe such a finding in any part of the sample period. In that sense, this 
thesis reveals a very important characteristic of the IT regime, which has not been 
analyzed in the literature. 
  
The rest of this paper comprises three chapters. The second chapter presents the 
estimation methodology of unobserved components used in the analysis of the 
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subsequent chapters together with the data and sample. The third chapter gives the 
empirical results of the thesis. Mainly, the inflation variability aversions and 
response of inflation to a demand shock for the countries in our sample are present in 
this chapter. Finally, section four concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
ESTIMATION OF THE UNOBSERVED COMPONENTS 
 
  
In this chapter we will present our methodology used in the estimation of the 
parameters and variables, which we use in the calculation of the degree of inflation 
variability aversion of the central banks and evolution of the inflation in response to 
a shock coming to output-gap.  
 
One of the most important elements in the information set of the central bank in the 
conduct of monetary policy is the output-gap, which is defined as deviations of 
actual output from its potential level. Okun (1964) defines the potential output as the 
maximum amount of output produced without inflationary pressures. If the output 
exceeds the potential level then this signals rise in future inflationary pressures. In 
the seminal work of Taylor (1993), output gap is taken as an important determinant 
of the path of short term policy rates set by central banks pursuing price stability. 
Taylor (1993) proposes a policy rule. When output is above (below) potential level 
then policy requires a rise (decline) in the short--term interest rates. Output-gap is a 
sign of future demand pressures. Therefore, the importance of the measurement of 
the output-gap increases under IT regime. The sign of it calls for the required policy 
reaction which is necessary in order not to miss the target. However, the potential 
output and consequently the output-gap are unobservable variables. Therefore 
several techniques are devised in order to estimate them. 
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The most popular technique used in the estimation of the potential output is the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. HP filter is a smoothing algorithm which decomposes 
the original series to its long-run trend and cyclical components. The long-run trend 
in the actual output data is assumed to be the potential output. However this 
technique has several shortcomings. First of all, it is a pure statistical filter and it 
does not take into account the other variables, which interact with the main variable 
of interest. Secondly, although the end sample estimate of the potential output is the 
most vital information for the conduct of monetary policy, HP filter's end sample 
performance is poor due to its reliance to lead information. In addition, it is well 
documented in Laxton and Tetlow (1992) and Harvey and Jaeger (1993) that the H-P 
filter, produces imprecise estimates even for the United States economy, which the 
fluctuation in economic activity is relatively scarce. In addition, as Graff (2004) 
mentions, when the multivariate HP filter is employed, the revisions to real-time 
output gap have been no smaller than had a standard HP filter been used. Several 
other shortcomings of the HP filter are given in Orphanides and van Norden (1999). 
  
In addition to pure statistical techniques, production function approach is another 
way to estimate potential output. In the application of this methodology the 
assumptions regarding the production technology existing in the economy should be 
made. Afterwards, the real time data of endowments, such as capital and labor, are 
required to substitute into presumed production technology in order to derive the 
potential output. However, this method does not give precise estimates for emerging 
market economies due to unreliability of the data. As the reliability of the data 
increases output-gap measures derived via production function method becomes 
more reliable. Obviously, the quality of the data available for developed countries is 
 8
higher than the ones available for emerging market economies. Therefore OECD's 
output-gap estimates which are obtained through production function method will 
allow us to make comparisons between OECD's estimates and ours. 
  
One natural candidate for the estimation of the potential output which does not suffer 
from the above mentioned criticisms is to use statistical methods that have an 
economic content. Potential output is affected by the changes in microeconomic 
fundamentals such as productivity and labor supply. In the estimation of the potential 
output with bivariate filtering techniques, Kuttner (1994) rules out the 
microeconomic determinants of the potential output and deals with macroeconomic 
determinants. However, in this study it is assumed that the microeconomic variables, 
such as labor and capital productivity, remain unchanged for a long period. Given the 
rapidly changing macroeconomic dynamics as well as the characteristics of the 
monetary policy and fiscal policy, assuming a constant relationship between the 
macroeconomic variables can be a strong assumption. This study extends Kuttner 
(1994) in that direction and estimates a time-varying system of equations, where the 
output-gap and the potential output are treated as unobservable variables. By doing 
so, the changing macroeconomic dynamics can be clearly captured and the effects of 
different monetary policy regimes on output-gap can be analyzed. One similarity 
with Kuttner (1994) is that we rule out the micro determinants and focus on 
macroeconomic variables. However, as mentioned before, we will compare our 
estimates with the OECD's official output-gap estimates for robustness purposes. 
Another contribution of this thesis is that, unlike Laubach and Williams (2003), 
Kuttner (1994) and Gerlach and Smets (1999), we employ a more structured system: 
Different than specifying a time series process for the output-gap, we assume that the 
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unobserved output-gap is affected by a set of exogenous variables. By doing so, we 
derive the output-gap from a more structured economic content. The next section 
describes our model. 
 
  
II.1 The Model 
 
We assume that the economy can be characterized with a set of equations which are 
given below. Quarterly seasonally adjusted consumer price index (CPI)1 inflation 
rate is denoted by tπ  ( t  denotes time), tgap  is the unobserved output gap, tIP  is the 
logarithmic difference of import price index, ty  is the seasonally adjusted 
logarithmic real gross domestic product, *ty  is the unobserved potential output, tµ  is 
the potential output growth rate, and finally tr  is the ex-post real interest rate based 
on commercial bank rate or overnight lending rate. The detailed breakdown of the 
data sources are given in the data appendix. Shocks to the system are denoted by the 
disturbance terms, which are assumed to be i.i.d with zero mean and constant 
variance. 
( )
1, 1 2, 1 2 3, 1 1 4, 1
*
* *
1 1
0 1
1, 2, 3,
1
t t t t t t t t t t
t t t
t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
gap IP
y y gap
y y
gap gap r IP
π α π α π α α ν
µ η
µ ρ µ ρ µ ς
γ γ γ ξ
− − − − − −
− −
−
= + + + +
= +
= + +
= − + +
= + + +
 
 
                                                 
1 Since CPI is the most commonly observed price index, which is closely associated with the 
expectations about inflation in the economy, using annualized CPI inflation is thought to be 
appropriate. 
(1) 
(5) 
(4)
(2)
(3) 
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The first equation of our system characterizes the inflation dynamics. It is a Philips 
curve specification, where the inertia is represented with two lagged values of 
inflation. In addition, the inflationary pressure of the aggregate demand is controlled 
by the lagged value of the output-gap, while the supply side cost effects of the 
exchange rate developments are taken into account by including the import price 
index. Existence of the output-gap with one period lag ensures the delay in the 
transmission of the demand shock to inflation. 
  
As in Watson (1986), Kuttner (1994) and Harvey and Jaeger (1993) we decompose 
actual output as the sum of unobserved potential output and output-gap in the second 
equation. The third equation defines the potential output as a random walk with a 
drift. Since the coefficient of lagged potential output is equal to unity, shocks to the 
potential output have permanent effects, as implied in Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
The fourth equation describes the evolution of the potential output growth rate tµ . 
With such a specification the tµ  is assumed to be a function of its own lagged value 
and a pre-determined steady state growth rate 0µ . The parameter ρ  ( 10 << ρ ) 
shows the degree of the persistence of the tµ . In the one extreme, having ρ  close to 
unity signals that potential output growth rate can diverge from the steady state 
growth value for substantially long periods, and vice-versa. As discussed by 
Orphanides and van Norden (1999), linear models which characterize tµ  as a cycle 
around a constant, 0µ  in our case, have large revisions due to parameter instability in 
the estimated tµ . In addition, a large set of countries, including the industrialized 
economies in our sample have experienced structural transformations through the 
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period being analyzed. These points provide the basis for assuming a time varying 
growth rate for the trend. 
  
The final equation of the model describes the evolution of the output gap. As 
mentioned above, rather than specifying a pure time series process, we also include 
several macroeconomic variables that are thought to affect the output-gap. While 
setting these regressors, with a new Keynesian perspective, we included a monetary 
policy variable and a cost factor which may lead to deviation of actual output from 
its potential level in the short-run. As a result the regressors are the first lagged value 
of the output-gap, the real interest rate and the import price index. None of these 
regressors is assumed to affect the potential output. The real interest rate, as the 
policy instrument for the central bank, affects the output through the conventional 
monetary policy transmission mechanism. Any increase in the interest rate at time 
$t$ causes a decrease in the actual output level through a decrease in investment and 
consumption. However, the role of import price index is less clear. The changes in 
the value of the domestic currency will have its effect directly in the import price 
index. A decrease in the import price index via appreciation of the domestic currency 
will lead to a decrease in the net exports and thus lower the aggregate demand. 
However, in such a case the consumption and the investment upsurge due to lower 
cost of imported intermediate and final goods. As a result, the net effect of import 
price index on the output-gap is ambiguous. 
  
In addition to the above equations in the system, our model consists of eight more 
equations. The number of time varying parameters in the system is eight and for 
estimation purposes we have to specify a time series process for each of these time 
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varying parameters. As it is stated in Evans (1991), one fundamental source of the 
variations in the economy is the changing views about the structure of the economy. 
Therefore, if we assume that the unexpected policy changes lead to a change in the 
relationship between two variables then it is appropriate to specify a random walk 
process for our system parameters. The next section gives the state-space form of the 
above system. 
 
II.2 The State Space Representation 
  
An unobserved components model can be estimated after the system of equations is 
presented in a state-space form where the standard Kalman filter emerges as the 
optimal estimation algorithm. However, in our model, the fact that time-varying 
parameters and the unobserved state variables in E1, E4, and E5 appear in 
multiplicative forms, rules out the linearity in the state-space. Therefore, standard 
Kalman filter is no longer appropriate to estimate the unobserved components. 
Formally the state-space form can be written as: 
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In such cases the extended Kalman filter is used to estimate the state of a system 
which is governed by non-linear stochastic difference equations. More specifically, 
the state-space representation will be as: 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
2
1x t Fx t Gu t e t
z t Hx t e t
= − + +
= +  
E6 and E72 are state and observation equations, respectively. Vector of state and 
control variables of our system are tx  and tu , respectively. tz  is a vector and its first 
and second elements are tπ  and ty , respectively. The state vector contains both 
unobserved and observed variables. The matrix F  relates the state at time t  to the 
state at time 1−t  and matrix G  relates the control at time t  to the state at time 1−t . 
Both F  and G  matrices contains a priori unknown time varying parameters. 
Measurement and transition noises are 1e  and 2e , respectively. They are assumed to 
be independent of each other, white, and normally distributed. 
  
                                                 
2 Henceforth we will use EX in order to refer to equation number X. 
1
*
1, 2, 3, 4,1
1 2
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1
1, 1
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1
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3, 2,
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r
υ
µ η
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(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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Before executing the extended Kalman filter algorithm, we first treat each time-
varying parameter as a new state variable and form the extended state vector. Finally, 
we linearize the estimation around the current estimate using the partial derivatives 
of the state and observation functions3. The results are given in the section. 
 
II.3 The Data and Sample  
 
The data used in this thesis is mostly obtained from International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) of International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, for some variables we 
request the data from the central banks of the countries mentioned below. The 
detailed breakdown of the data sources is given in the data appendix.  
  
In this thesis, our sample consists of industrialized countries, in which the central 
banks that adopted IT before 1999 are classified as IT countries while the ones that 
have not shifted to IT before 1999 are classified as non-IT countries. IT countries 
are; Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Whereas 
Denmark, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States 
account for control group of non-IT countries. 
  
We take the adoption dates of inflation targeting from Bernanke et al. (1999), which 
are available in Table 1 in the Appendix C. IT countries except Spain continue to 
design their monetary policy strategy under the IT framework. Spain has abandoned 
the targeting framework due to the advent of the Euro. Our sample consists of 
countries which are members of European Monetary Union (EMU), namely Spain, 
                                                 
3 The details of the algorithm can be obtained from the book titled “Theory and practice of recursive 
identification” by Ljung and Soderstrom (1983). 
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Italy and the Netherlands. Membership of the EMU ties the individual central banks' 
hands in the conduct of independent monetary policy. In other words, EMU countries 
monetary strategies are based on fixing exchange rate and meeting convergence 
criteria. Therefore members of the EMU are not considered as IT countries. 
Switzerland and Norway adopted inflation targeting in 2000 and 2001, respectively. 
As in Ball and Sheridan (2003), we exclude these countries' brief targeting periods 
and treat them as non-IT countries. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
 
In this chapter we will first present our resulting estimates of the output-gap series 
together with their empirical fit for the countries in our sample. Secondly, we will 
calculate the inflation variability aversions of the countries in our sample, and 
investigate whether IT and non-IT countries have differing degree of aversion 
towards inflation variability. Furthermore, we will try to discover whether IT 
countries increased their revealed aversion to inflation variability more than non-IT 
countries after adoption of IT. Finally, we will discover the impact of IT on the 
evolution of the inflation in response to a demand shock. 
 
III.1 Output-gap Estimates  
 
The model that is introduced above can be criticized for lacking a pure structural 
content. Thus, we will test the empirical fit of our model on two grounds. Firstly, we 
will compare our output-gap estimates, with the OECD's officially announced 
estimates. Secondly, we will test whether our assumptions about the time-series 
specification of the parameters and the distribution of the error terms present in the 
system are satisfied or not. 
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The estimated output-gap series can be seen in figure 1a and 1b. Upper panel and 
lower panel of the figure contain IT and non-IT countries' output gap series, 
respectively. The empirical fit of the estimated series is going to be evaluated with 
direct comparison with the OECD's estimates. The correlation coefficient between 
the OECD's estimate and our estimate is given in the lower right corner of each plot. 
New Zealand has the lowest correlation coefficient which is approximately 0.30. In 
fact, the average value of correlation coefficient for the whole sample is 0.70, 
providing support for the empirical fit of the model. Furthermore, as a striking 
example we plot the Bank of Canada's4 and ours estimate together in figure 2. In that 
sense, when our output gap estimate for Canada is compared with the Bank of 
Canada’s official estimates, we see that the two series are almost identical. 
 
Figure 1a: Output-gap estimates of non-IT countries 
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4 Bank of Canada's output-gap estimate is publicly available on the web (www.bankofcanada.ca). 
ρ=0.7143 ρ=0.5119 
ρ=0.6723 ρ=0.6141 
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Figure 1a, cont. 
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Figure 1b: Output-gap estimates of IT countries 
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 Figure 2: Comparison with Bank of Canada’s  
official estimate 
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Next, we will test whether the time-varying parameters present in our system actually 
follow random-walk. As it can be seen in Table 2 of Appendix C, the resulting 
coefficient obtained after regressing each parameter to its own lagged value is close 
to unity. This and the comparison of output-gap estimates with officially announced 
Note: Above graphs are the output gap series of the non-IT and IT countries. 
Sample period is 1985q2-2004q3 for New Zealand and 1980q2-2004q3 for the 
remaining countries. The term ρ in the lower right corner of each graph is the 
correlation coefficient between OECD’s estimate and ours. OECD publishes output 
gap estimates on a yearly basis and they are available from 1984 to 2003. We 
calculate the yearly output gap estimate as the weighted average of the quarterly 
output gap,
*4
*
1
q q
year
q year
gap y
gap
y=
= ∑ .  
ρ=0.8587 ρ=0.8980 
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estimates allow us to defend the empirical fit of our model. In the next chapter, we 
will discover whether IT actually matters in terms of degree of inflation variability 
aversion and evolution of the inflation in response to a demand shock in IT and non-
IT countries. 
 
III.2 Inflation Variability Aversion in IT and Non-IT Countries 
  
This section explains the calculation of the inflation aversion coefficients of the 
countries in our sample. The formula used in the derivation of aversion coefficients 
is same as the one derived in Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000) (CE). Before presenting 
our methodology and results, we will briefly discuss the model developed in CE. 
 
In CE, it is assumed that the central banker has a quadratic loss function which is 
increasing in its two arguments; square of the deviation of actual output from the 
potential one, and the deviation of inflation from its desired level (in case of IT, it 
can be thought of as inflation target itself). The main interest of CE is to calculate the 
degree of aversion to inflation variability of the central banker. The actual output and 
the realized inflation (arguments of the loss function) are functions of interest rate, 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks. The policy tool of the central bank 
which it uses to accommodate the adverse shocks is the short-term interest rate. In 
order to minimize the value of the loss function, central bank decides on the path of 
the interest rate. In CE, it is assumed that aggregate demand shocks affect the output 
and inflation in the same direction and central bank can fully accommodate it by 
changing interest rates. On the other hand, since aggregate supply shocks move the 
output and the inflation in the opposite directions, aggregate supply shocks create a 
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trade-off in the policy action. By using its policy tools, the central bank is assumed to 
be capable of moving output and inflation in the same direction. Therefore, changing 
interest rates is analogous to an aggregate demand shock. Since aggregate demand 
shocks do not create a tradeoff, central bank is capable of fully accommodating it. 
On the other hand, the response to aggregate supply shocks is more complex. This 
complexity stems from the move of output and inflation in opposite directions in case 
of an aggregate supply shock. The magnitude of the interest rate response to an 
aggregate supply shock depends upon the slopes of the aggregate demand and supply 
curves together with the policymaker's aversion to inflation variability. Derivation of 
the optimal policy rule in such a setting gives the expression for the inflation 
aversion coefficient given in (10). 
  
( )
22
2 1
y
π
σ θ
σ β θ
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
The arguments therein are the followings; 2yσ  and 2πσ  are the variances of the actual 
output and realized inflation, respectively. The terms β  and θ  denote the slope of 
inverse supply curve and the degree of aversion to inflation variability, respectively. 
During the calculation of the inflation aversion measure, CE calculates 2yσ  and 2πσ  
from the data. For the inverse supply slope, they specify a Vector Autoregression 
Model (VAR) and obtain the impulse responses. Such an approach is adopted from 
King et al. (1991). As a result, having obtained these measures, they calculate the 
inflation aversion from the above formula. After we briefly explain the methodology 
used in CE, we will proceed with our methodology. 
  
(10) 
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Including this thesis, in several studies like Corbo et al. (2001) and Tachibana 
(2004), the inflation variability aversion is calculated with the expression in (10). In 
that sense, the literature agrees upon a common formula. However, the calculation of 
β  (slope of the inverse supply curve) differs in each study. In this thesis, we derive 
β  from the system of equations devised in E1-E5. Such an approach leads us to 
obtain a model consistent measure. The exercise is conducted in two steps. First, we 
give a one percent shock to the interest rate. As we mentioned earlier, change in 
interest rate is analogous to an aggregate demand shock. Therefore, both the output 
and the inflation will be affected in the same direction due to the change in the 
interest rate. Next, in order to calculate β , we calculate the ratio of average of fifteen 
quarter change in the output to average of fifteen quarter change in the inflation. The 
derivation of equations used in the calculation of β  is given in the Appendix 2. 
  
This thesis also differs from CE in the calculation of 2yσ . While CE calculates the 
“desired” trend using the HP filter, which has shortcomings as discussed in the 
previous sections, we derive the ''desired'' trend from our model, which is introduced 
above. In that sense, we utilize a more structured measure of output variability. 
Finally, we calculate 2πσ  under two distinct assumptions which we make regarding 
the desired rate of inflation: In the first specification, following CE, we set the 
desired rate equal to two percent, while in the second one the desired rate is taken as 
the sample average. We separately report the resulting θ s (inflation aversion 
coefficient) obtained under each assumption. 
  
After obtaining the inflation aversion measures with the method specified above, we 
test whether inflation aversions for both groups of countries have changed 
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significantly through time. In other words, we will analyze whether implementing IT 
has made a significant difference in terms of inflation aversion. For this purpose, we 
will first calculate the average value of IT countries’ θ  for the periods before and 
after the regime shift, whereas for non-IT countries we will calculate the average 
value of θ  for the periods before and after the first quarter of 19935. 
  
The results show that, the mean value of the IT countries' average θ  before (after) 
the regime shift is less (greater) than the corresponding value of the non-IT countries 
(Table 3 of Appendix C). However, these results are not robust. When we do the 
same exercise excluding Italy and Japan from the sample of non-IT countries, the 
average value of non-IT countries’ θ  turns out to be greater than the average value 
of IT countries’ θ  in both periods being considered. Therefore, it may me misleading 
to reach a conclusion that IT countries were less (more) averse to inflation variability 
before (after) the regime shift compared to non-IT countries. Furthermore, after 
conducting two independent samples t-test6 we also find that the average value of IT 
countries’ θ s before and after the shift to IT is not significantly different from the 
average value of non-IT countries' corresponding value before and after the first 
quarter of 1993, respectively. These findings are robust to the way we calculate the 
2
πσ . The next exercise is to check whether IT countries increased their revealed 
aversion to inflation variability more than non-IT countries do after the regime shift 
occurred. Unlike the previous results the degree of the change in θ  differs between 
IT and non-IT countries. The upper (lower) half of the Table 4 of Appendix C shows 
the change in the average value of θ s in IT (non-IT) countries before and after the 
                                                 
5 The reason for taking the first quarter of 1993 as the benchmark for non-IT countries is that, except 
Spain, by this date all of the IT countries in the sample have shifted to their new policy regimes. 
6 Since we want to compare the means of two independent groups, two independent samples t-test 
emerges as an appropriate test.}}, 
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adoption date (the first quarter of 1993). The magnitude of the change in the mean 
value of θ  are significantly different from zero for all IT and in some of the non-IT 
countries except Japan and Switzerland. One other test to check whether the average 
value of θ  of the countries available in our sample has increased is Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test7 (Table 5 of Appendix C). The results are the followings; under the first 
method (desired rate of inflation is equal to 2%), all countries except Japan and 
Switzerland, have significantly increased their revealed aversion to inflation 
variability, while these two countries have significantly decreased their revealed 
aversion to inflation variability. When we conduct the same test under the second 
method (desired rate of inflation is equal to sample average) it seems that the change 
in the mean for the Australia's and Japan's revealed aversion to inflation variability 
have decreased, whereas the same magnitude has not changed in Norway, 
Switzerland, and the USA. The remaining IT countries seem to have increased their 
revealed aversion to inflation variability. In order to test whether these results are 
attributable to the shift in monetary policy regime, we finally check whether IT 
central banks have increased their revealed aversion to inflation variability more than 
non-IT countries. When the desired rate of inflation is assumed to be 2\%, the 
average increases in θ  are 0.2069 and 0.0305 for IT and non-IT countries (Table 4 of 
Appendix C), respectively. Whereas, when the desired rate is assumed to be the 
sample average, the average increases in the θ  are 0.0987 and 0.0047 for IT and 
non-IT countries, respectively. When we conduct two independent samples t-test 
once more, we find that IT central banks increased their revealed aversion to 
                                                 
7 Basically, we test whether the average value of θ  has increased after the adoption of IT. In order to 
test this, we treat the values of θ  before and after the adoption of IT as two independent groups. 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is the non-parametric version of the independent samples t-test and can 
be used when you do not assume that the dependent variable (θ ) is a normally distributed interval 
dependent variable (the only assumption is that the variable is ordinal 
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inflation variability significantly more than non-IT countries. This finding is robust 
when we exclude the Italy and Japan from our sample. 
  
As a result, the main message from this section is clear: Consistent with CE, almost 
every central bank in our sample has increased their revealed aversion to inflation 
variability during 1990s. However, our results differ in the sense that the magnitude 
of the change is greater in IT countries compared to non-IT countries. In CE, this 
difference is found to be modest. However, we conclude that the difference is far 
from being modest. Thus, we can claim that the characteristics of IT framework 
provide an extra support for achieving price stability incentives of the monetary 
authorities. In the next section, we will investigate additional features that can be 
ascribed to the IT regimes in terms of macroeconomic performance. The main 
emphasis will be on the evolution of shocks coming to gap on inflation.  
  
III.3 Evolution of the Response of Inflation to Demand Shocks 
  
The previous section shows that, although increasing aversion to inflation has been a 
common characteristic of the industrialized countries in the sample, the increase in 
the inflation aversion within an inflation targeting regime is found to be significantly 
higher. This section investigates another advantage of IT regimes in the 
policymaking process. 
  
As mentioned in the first section, commitment and transparency are two of the 
identifying characteristics of IT regimes. While the former ensures that actual 
inflation will not deviate significantly from its pre-announced target, the latter helps 
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to build the expectations of the public in a positive way. Thus, when faced with an 
inflationary shock that is temporary, IT central banks are expected to pursue an 
aggressive monetary policy to achieve the pre-announced target. Evenly important, 
during this process, increased communication with the public will serve the purpose 
of keeping inflation expectations anchored within a certain band. As a result, it can 
be expected that inflation dynamics will be less sensitive to temporary shocks in the 
economy. 
  
Based on the above discussion, this section displays another important characteristic 
of the inflation-targeting regimes, which has not been investigated in the literature 
before. Employing our semi-structural time series model, we show that the response 
of inflation to output gap shocks have been significantly lower after the countries 
have switched to IT regimes. However, we do not observe such a pattern for the 
other countries. 
  
For achieving the above-mentioned result, we obtain the impulse responses of the 
inflation to an output gap shock. However, such an impulse response analysis is not 
trivial, since we handle the problem in a time-varying fashion. In addition, for 
comparison, we should derive the impulse responses for three different time spans: 
before inflation targeting, after inflation targeting and the last fifteen observations. 
The change in tξ  (demand shock) creates a change in the output-gap and since the 
lagged value of the output-gap is available in E5, the effect does not die out 
immediately. Furthermore, in E1 (equation of tπ ) the output-gap is available and the 
change in tπ  occurs due to the change in output-gap. Iterating the system forwards 
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will give us the impulse response funtions. Appendix 2 explains how the impulse 
responses are derived for these different time periods. 
  
Figures 2a and 2b show the estimated impulse responses for the two sets of countries. 
Figure 2a presents the results for the non-IT countries. It is clear that, except Japan, 
the impulse responses of inflation to output gap shocks are almost identical for the 
three sample periods. For Japan, we actually find that inflation has become even 
more sensitive to temporary output gap shocks. Excluding the Japanese economy, 
another interesting result is that the shape of the impulse response functions for the 
non-inflation targeters are alike: Other than the initial increase in the response of 
inflation, we see a second hike within the first five quarters. Finally, we should add 
that, as expected, the effect of these temporary shocks die out in the long-run. 
Figure 2a: Response of inflation in  
non-IT countries to a unit shock coming to output-gap 
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Figure 2b provides the most interesting result in this thesis. When the impulse 
response of the inflation to an output gap shock is estimated, it can be seen by visual 
inspection that all of the IT countries experience a downward level shift. Moreover, 
this result is robust to the sample selection in the post IT regime.  
 
Figure 2a: Response of inflation in 
IT countries to a unit shock coming to output-gap 
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In order to provide further support for the above findings, we also use the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test8 in order to see whether the difference between the impulse 
responses is statistically significant. Table 6 of Appendix C reports the test results. 
Under the null hypothesis that the difference between the median values of the 
response of inflation to an output gap shock do not differ between the two periods, 
we find that for all of the IT countries, the impulse responses significantly differs 
between the two periods. For the other group of countries, except Switzerland9, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis. As a result, we can conveniently claim that 
                                                 
8 We use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test because the difference of the magnitudes of the response of 
inflation to output-gap shocks among before adoption, after adoption and the last fifteen period can be 
classified as positive and negative. 
9 One major drawback of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is that it does not take into account the 
magnitude of the difference. It takes the difference merely as positive and negative. Although the 
magnitude of the response of inflation to a shock coming to output-gap is negligible, it is negative. 
Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
After adoption
Last fifteen quarter
 Before adoption
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operating under an IT framework makes inflation dynamics less prone to temporary 
output gap shocks. 
  
As mentioned before, such a finding has not been documented in the previous 
studies. In this respect, the closest study is Gurkaynak et al. (2006). Analyzing the 
effect of macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy announcements on long-
term inflation expectations, they find that a credible IT framework helps anchor the 
inflation outcomes in the long run. More specifically, their results show that, after the 
United Kingdom and Sweden adopted IT, inflation expectations have became less 
sensitive to macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy announcements, while 
the same finding cannot be obtained for the United States, which is a non-IT country. 
Since macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy announcements can be 
regarded as anonymous to temporary output gap shocks, the findings in these two 
studies are consistent. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Does IT matter in developed countries? In this thesis, on the contrary to several 
studies in the literature, our claim is that it matters. The emphasis given to 
transparency and commitment in the conduct of IT has a significant role in anchoring 
long-run inflation expectations. Increased aversion to inflation variability might be 
the one of the most important factors that might contribute to anchoring long-run 
inflation expectations. In the literature, several studies has focused on the inflation 
variability aversions of IT and non-IT countries. The pioneering work in this narrow 
field is Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2001) (CE). We calculate their model specific 
inflation aversion measure from our semi structural dynamic time series model and 
conclude that almost every country in our sample have increased their aversion to 
inflation variability. However, our results confirm CE's in the sense that IT countries 
have increased their aversion to inflation variability significantly more than non-IT 
countries in the 1990s and the difference is not modest as it is claimed in the CE. 
This difference may stem from not analyzing the same sample of countries in the 
same sample periods. The second and maybe the most important conclusion of this 
paper is the behavior of inflation in the aftermath of a demand shock. The evolution 
of the demand shock on inflation is not same as the one occurred before adoption of 
IT in IT countries. We observe a significant decrease in the magnitude of the change. 
However, in non-IT countries this difference is not present. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
DATA 
 
The sources of the data used in this thesis are given below.  
 
Australia: All data are taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS) catalogue 
of International Monetary Fund (IMF). Data for interest rate is available with the 
code 15660B..ZF... Consumer price index is available with the code 15664…ZF… 
Import prices index is available with the code 15675…ZF… Finally, seasonally 
adjusted GDP volume with 2000 prices is available with the code 15699BVRZF. 
 
Canada: All data are taken from IFS catalogue. Overnight money market rate is 
given with the code 15660B..ZF… CPI is given with the code 15664.ZF… Import 
price index is given with the code 15675.ZF… Finally, seasonally adjusted GDP 
volume with 2000 prices is available with the code 15699BVRZF… 
 
Denmark: All data are taken from the IFS catalogue. Call money rate is available 
with the code 12860B..ZF… CPI is available with the code 12864..ZF… Import 
price index is available with the code 12876.X.ZF… Finally, GDP volume with 2000 
prices is available with the code 12899BVPZF… 
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Italy: All data are taken from the IFS catalogue. Money market rate is available with 
the code 13660B..ZF… CPI is available with the code 13464..ZF… Unit value of 
imports is available with 13675…ZF… Finally, seasonally adjusted GDP volume 
with 2000 prices is available with the code 13699BVRZF… 
Japan: All data are taken from the IFS catalogue. Call money rate is available with 
the code 15860B..ZF… CPI is available with the code 15864..ZF… Import price 
index is available with the code 15876.X.ZF… Finally, seasonally adjusted GDP 
volume with 2000 prices is available with the code 15899BVRZF… 
 
Netherlands: All data except central bank’s policy rate are taken from the IFS 
catalogue. Policy rate is obtained from the central bank of Netherlands. CPI is 
available with the code 13864..ZF… in the IFS catalogue. Import price index is 
available with the code 13875.ZF… Finally, seasonally adjusted GDP volume with 
2000 prices is available with the code 13899BVRZF… 
 
New Zealand: All data are taken from the IFS catalogue. Money market rate is 
available with the code 19660B..ZF… CPI is available with the code 19664..ZF… 
Import price index is available with the code 19676.X.ZF… Finally, seasonally 
adjusted GDP volume with 2000 prices is available with the code 15899BVRZF… 
 
Norway: All data are taken from the IFS catalogue. Call money rate is available with 
the code 14260B..ZF… CPI is available with the code 14264..ZF… Import price 
index is available with the code 14275.ZF… Finally, GDP volume with 2000 prices 
is available with the code 14299BVPZF… 
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Spain: All data are taken from the IFS catalogue. Call money rate is available with 
the code 18460B..ZF… CPI is available with the code 18464..ZF… Import price 
index is available with the code 18475...ZF… Finally, Seasonally adjusted GDP 
volume with 2000 prices is available with the code 18499BVRZF… 
 
Sweden: All data are taken from the IFS catalogue. Call money rate is available with 
the code 14460B..ZF… CPI is available with the code 14464..ZF… Import price 
index is available with the code 14476.X.ZF… Finally, seasonally adjusted GDP 
volume with 2000 prices is available with the code 14499BVRZF… 
 
Switzerland: All data are taken from the IFS catalogue. Call money rate is available 
with the code 14660B..ZF… CPI is available with the code 14664..ZF… Import 
price index is available with the code 14676.X.ZF… Finally, seasonally adjusted 
GDP volume with 2000 prices is available with the code 14699BVRZF… 
 
UK: All data are taken from the IFS catalogue. Overnight interbank interest rate is 
available with the code 11260B..ZF… CPI is available with the code 11264..ZF… 
Import price index is available with the code 11276.X.ZF… Finally, seasonally 
adjusted GDP volume with 2000 prices is available with the code 15899BVRZF… 
 
USA: All data are taken from the IFS catalogue. Federal funds rate is available with 
the code 11160B..ZF… CPI is available with the code 11164..ZF… Import price 
index is available with the code 11176.X.ZF… Finally, seasonally adjusted GDP 
volume with 2000 prices is available with the code 11199BVRZF… 
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APPENDIX B 
 
TECHNICAL 
 
 
In this appendix, we will describe the method we employed in the calculation of the 
slope of the inverse supply curve and the evolution of the response of inflation to a 
shock coming to output-gap. 
  
Appendix B.1: Calculation of the Inverse Supply Slope 
  
B.1.1 and B.1.2 give the evolution of the effect of the interest rate shock on output 
and inflation, respectively. Interest rate change affects the output through its effect 
on the output-gap. The gap equation (E5) contains interest rate ( tr ), lagged value of 
the output-gap ( 1−tgap ), and the import price index tIP  on the right. The interest rate 
change at time t  affects the output-gap immediately by the amount of t,2γ  (the 
parameter in front of the tr ). Existence of the lagged value of the output-gap in E5 
ensures the transmission of the effect of the interest rate change to output-gap at time 
1+t  and onwards. itQ +  (B.1.1) denotes the magnitude of the entire effect of interest 
rate change on the output-gap at time it + . In other words, B.1.1 gives the 
coefficient in front of the tgap  in the equation of itgap + . Moreover, the same change 
in tr  affects the inflation. The right hand side variables in the inflation equation (E1) 
of our model are the followings; the first and the second lagged values of inflation, 
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the first lagged value of the output gap, and the import price index. However, tr  does 
not show up in the inflation equation. Therefore the change in tr  does not affect tπ  
immediately ( 0=tP ), rather the effect occurs with a period lag. This delay can be 
thought of as monetary policy lag. However, at time jt + , where [ ]15,1∈j , change 
in tr  starts to be effective on inflation through the parameters in front of the 1−+itπ , 
2−+itπ , and 1−+itgap . The total effect is given in B.1.2 by jtP + . Finally, the β  (slope 
of the inverse supply curve) is given in A.1.3 which is calculated by the ratio of the 
expected value of itQ +  and itP + . 
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Appendix B.2: Derivation of the Impulse Responses 
  
The estimate of the response of inflation to a demand shock is derived from the 
model that we construct in order to obtain the output-gap series. As it is evident from 
B.2.1 (E1) and B.2.2 (E5), a shock coming to output-gap (demand shock), which hits 
the economy will create a change in the output-gap. Furthermore, the existence of the 
1−tgap  in B.2.1 will form a basis for the transmission of the demand shock to 
inflation. A unit increase in the ξ  (a demand shock) at time t  will be effective on the 
output gap immediately. However, since the output-gap is available in B.2.1 with a 
(B.1.1) 
(B.1.2) 
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quarter lag, a one unit increase in the ξ  will be effective on the inflation with a 
quarter lag. The existence of the lagged values of the π  in the equation for itself will 
also contribute to the transmission of the demand shock. Therefore previous shocks 
which hit the economy will not die out immediately. Likewise, output-gap is a 
function of the lag value of itself. This implies that the demand shock at time t  will 
also be effective on the output-gap in the future. The evolution of the effect of the 
demand shock on inflation is given below. 
  
1 1, 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 4, 1 1 1
1, 1 2, 4,
, 1 3, 1
, 2 1, 2 , 1 3, 2 1, 1
, 3 1, 3 , 2 2, 3 , 1 3, 3 1, 2 1, 1
....................
t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
t t
t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
gap
gap gap r IP
π
π π
π π π
π α π α π α α π υ
γ γ γ ξ
α
α α γ
α α α γ γ
+ + + − + + + +
−
+ +
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + + +
= + + + +
= + + +
∆ =
∆ = ∆ +
∆ = ∆ + ∆ +
14
, 15 1, 15 , 14 2, 15 , 13 3, 15 1,
1
....
t t t t t t t i
i
π π πα α α γ+ + + + + + +
=
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∏
 
,t iπ +∆  denotes the effect of the change in ξ  on inflation, at time it + . The process 
starts with a unit change in the ξ  (demand shock) at time t . As it was stated earlier, 
it immediately affects the gap . Whereas, since none of the variables on the right 
hand side of the 
tπ
 is affected from the demand shock, tπ  remains unaltered at time 
t . However, at time 1+t  the demand shock becomes effective on the inflation. The 
term tgap  which is available in the equation for 1+tπ , provides the transmission of 
the demand shock to the 1+tπ . However, the transmission will not be complete. The 
total change in 1+tπ  will be 1,3 +tα  times the magnitude of the demand shock (which is 
equal to one). Whereas, at time 2+t , the transmission of the demand shock to π  
will be through the terms 1+tπ  and 1+tgap  which are available on the right hand side 
(B.2.1) 
(B.2.2) 
(B.2.3) 
(B.2.4) 
(B.2.5) 
(B.2.15) 
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of the equation for 2+tπ . At time 3+t , the transmission occurs through the first and 
the second lag values of 3+tπ  and the first lag value of 3+tgap . The effects of the 
demand shock on 2+tπ , 1+tπ , and 2+tgap  partially transmits to the 3+tπ . The 
parameters in front of the lagged values of the inflation and output-gap in the 
equation for 3+tπ  serve as discount factors (e.g. only 3,1 +tα  times the magnitude of 
the demand shock on 2+tπ  transmits to 3+tπ ).  
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APPENDIX C 
TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Date of adoption  Sample period 
IT countries    
   Australia Q1 1993  Q1 1980-2005 Q4 
   Canada Q4 1990  Q1 1980-2005 Q4 
   New Zealand Q2 1989  Q1 1980-2005 Q4 
   Spain Q4 1994  Q1 1980-2002 Q1 
   Sweden Q4 1992  Q1 1980-2005 Q4 
   UK Q3 1992  Q1 1980-2005 Q4 
Non-IT countries    
   Denmark .....  Q1 1980-2005 Q4 
   Italy .....  Q1 1980-2005 Q4 
   Japan .....  Q1 1980-2005 Q4 
   Netherlands .....  Q1 1980-2005 Q4 
   Norway .....  Q1 1980-2000 Q4 
   Switzerland .....  Q1 1980-1999 Q4 
   USA .....   Q1 1980-2005 Q4 
Table 1: Data of adoption and sample periods 
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Table 2: Testing Random Walk Hypothesis 
{ }1 1 2 3 4 1 2, 3    , , , , , ,t a t ta a aδ ε θ α α α α ρ γ γ γ−= + ∈ =  
Countries 
1αδ  2αδ  3αδ  4αδ  ρδ  1γδ  2γδ   3γ  
Australia 0.9992 [12987.50]*** 
0.9976 
[5928.20]*** 
0.9946 
[2882.54]*** 
0.9779 
[209.55]*** 
1.0005 
[18692.28]*** 
1.0003 
[26238.99]*** 
0.9545 
[93.22]*** 
0.9824 
[622.41]*** 
Canada 0.9974 [7153.51]*** 
0.9940 
[4010.26]*** 
0.9906 
[2652.79]*** 
0.9970 
[272.54]*** 
0.9996 
[14936.84]*** 
1.0013 
[9104.37]*** 
1.0085 
[326.85]*** 
1.0012 
[2883.03]*** 
Denmark 1.0010 [5178.17]*** 
1.0021 
[3297.05]*** 
1.0044 
[611.99]*** 
0.9343 
[350.22]*** 
0.9999 
[215598.18]*** 
1.0002 
[76530.55]*** 
1.0081 
[451.91]*** 
0.9998 
[5483.04]*** 
Italy 1.0000 [69854.32]*** 
1.0001 
[40618.90]*** 
0.9997 
[12638.81]*** 
1.0054 
[684.00]*** 
1.0001 
[39163.80]*** 
1.0001 
[105254.82]*** 
1.0097 
[262.06]*** 
0.9946 
[987.06]*** 
Netherlands 1.0015 [5653.04]*** 
0.9976 
[1396.60]*** 
0.9889 
[301.67]*** 
0.9857 
[163.65]*** 
1.0000 
[127559.61]*** 
1.0012 
[18637.40]*** 
1.0078 
[619.54]*** 
0.9995 
[1172.38]*** 
New 
Zealand 
0.9982 
[1169.27]*** 
0.9932 
[828.35]*** 
0.9843 
[223.52]*** 
0.9209 
[62.49]*** 
0.9971 
[1477.60]*** 
1.0017 
[6791.09]*** 
1.0179 
[271.03]*** 
0.9304 
[142.00]*** 
Norway 0.9999 [1072951.06]*** 
0.9999 
[770248.84]*** 
0.9997 
[37708.44]*** 
0.9998 
[25200.41]*** 
0.9996 
[13968.86]*** 
1.0003 
[32470.12]*** 
1.0064 
[1317.90]*** 
0.9922 
[2955.50]*** 
Spain 1.0013 [6118.28]*** 
0.9993 
[3481.43]*** 
0.9733 
[790.88]*** 
1.0213 
[96.87]*** 
0.9999 
[30245.03]*** 
1.0012 
[6400.65]*** 
0.9898 
[183.60]*** 
0.9192 
[245.00]*** 
Sweden 0.9992 [4114.73]*** 
0.9997 
[3417.29]*** 
0.9952 
[429.90]*** 
0.9920 
[449.77]*** 
1.0000 
[177734.33]*** 
1.0014 
[8476.53]*** 
1.0072 
[626.63]*** 
1.0014 
[844.00]*** 
Switzerland 1.0003 [13664.70]*** 
1.0004 
[9770.55]*** 
1.0031 
[815.91]*** 
0.9732 
[589.03]*** 
1.0001 
[88070.26]*** 
1.0010 
[10337.43]*** 
1.0064 
[379.00]*** 
1.0052 
[1798.44]*** 
UK 0.9998 [9003.00]*** 
0.9997 
[3002.03]*** 
0.9781 
[1083.75]*** 
0.9840 
[217.78]*** 
0.9995 
[9782.67]*** 
1.0005 
[9877.77]*** 
0.9956 
[89.07]*** 
0.9724 
[1200.43]*** 
USA 1.0004 [21074.61]*** 
0.9997 
[11545.28]*** 
1.0007 
[2546.93]*** 
0.9577 
[871.79]*** 
1.0010 
[7643.14]*** 
1.0010 
[10335.19]*** 
1.0032 
[287.56]*** 
1.0012 
[3669.55]*** 
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Before  
adoption  
After  
adoption  
Full sample
 
Before  
adoption  
After  
adoption  
Full sample
IT countries            
   Australia 0.6623  0.7504  0.7106  0.8058  0.7567  0.7827 
   Canada 0.6381  0.7981  0.7161  0.7657  0.7988  0.7848 
   New Zealand 0.5695  0.8407  0.7619  0.5711  0.8267  0.7901 
   Spain 0.5857  0.9624  0.6753  0.7874  0.9248  0.8446 
   Sweden 0.8170  0.9597  0.8866  0.8915  0.9636  0.9262 
   UK 0.6879  0.8940  0.7733  0.7627  0.9055  0.8332 
Average 0.6600  0.8675  0.7540  0.7640  0.8627  0.8270 
Non-IT countries 
Before the 1st 
quarter of 1993  
After the 1st 
quarter of 1993 
 Full sample  Before the 1
st 
quarter of 1993
 
After the 1st 
quarter of 1993
 Full sample
   Denmark 0.9149  0.9506  0.9310  0.9506  0.9568  0.95354 
   Italy 0.4741  0.7442  0.5960  0.7278  0.8194  0.77082 
   Japan 0.4224  0.2376  0.3390  0.4422  0.3579  0.4025 
   Netherlands 0.8872  0.9219  0.9029  0.9038  0.9259  0.9141 
   Norway 0.9122  0.9487  0.9287  0.9586  0.9480  0.9536 
   Switzerland 0.8864  0.8790  0.8831  0.9153  0.9179  0.9164 
   USA 0.8377  0.8806  0.8573  0.8927  0.8978  0.8951 
Average 0.7621  0.7946  0.7768  0.8273  0.8319  0.8294 
Table 3: Average values of inflation variability aversion (θ) 
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 µ(after)-µ(before)  µ(after)-µ(before) 
IT countries    
   Australia 0.0881 [0.0176]***  
-0.0491 
[0.0132] 
   Canada 0.1600 [0.0186]***  
0.0331 
[0.0148]*** 
   New Zealand 0.2711 [0.0229]***  
0.2556 
[0.0230]*** 
   Spain 0.3767 [0.0601]***  
0.1374 
[0.0267]*** 
   Sweden 0.1426 [0.0115]***  
0.0721 
[0.0070]*** 
   UK 0.2061 [0.3187]***  
0.1428 
[0.217]*** 
Average 0.2069  0.0987 
Non-IT countries    
   Denmark 0.0357 [0.0076]***  
0.0062 
[0.0035]** 
   Italy 0.2701 [0.0275]***  
0.0917 
[0.0250]*** 
   Japan -0.1848 [0.0130]  
-0.0843 
[0.0190] 
   Netherlands 0.0346 [0.0058]***  
0.0221 
[0.0052]*** 
   Norway 0.0365 [0.0062]***  
-0.0106 
[0.0044] 
   Switzerland -0.00732 [0.0084]  
0.0026 
[0.0073] 
   USA 0.0428 [0.0089]***  
0.0051 
[0.0074] 
Average 0.0325  0.0047 
*
*
 
           =%2
y potential output
π
= *
*
 
           =%2
y potential output
π
=
Table 4: The magnitude of the change in (θ) before and after 
adoption of IT 
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Table 5: Testing for the equality of the sum of the ranks of θ 
 * 2%π =   *π π=  
 z-value Prob>|z|  z-value Prob>|z| 
IT countries      
   Australia 2.706 0.0068  -3.435 0.0006 
   Canada 6.866 0.0000  1.775 0.0759 
   New Zealand 4.766 0.0000  4.665 0.0000 
   Spain 6.093 0.0000  4.509 0.0000 
   Sweden 7.256 0.0000  7.018 0.0000 
   UK 7.236 0.0000  6.508 0.0000 
Non-IT countries      
   Denmark 5.054 0.0000  1.683 0.0923 
   Italy 7.058 0.0000  2.427 0.0152 
   Japan -6.974 0.0000  -3.043 0.0023 
   Netherlands 4.966 0.0000  3.298 0.0010 
   Norway 5.17 0.0000  -1.337 0.1813 
   Switzerland -1.897 0.0578  1.547 0.1220 
   USA 4.421 0.0000  -0.703 0.4820 
IT countries P-value (Prob>Binomial(n=15, x>= Y, p=0.5) ) 
   Australia  0.0000 
   Canada 0.0000 
   New Zealand 0.0005 
   Spain 0.0005 
   Sweden  0.0000 
   UK 0.0005 
Non-IT countries   
   Denmark 1.0000 
   Italy 1.0000 
   Japan  1.0000 
   Netherlands 0.5000 
   Norway 0.9935 
   Switzerland 0.0005 
   USA 1.0000 
Ho: Median of response of inflation to output gap shock after IT (1993Q1)- Median of 
response of inflation to output gap shock before IT (1993Q1)= 0 
Ha: Median of response of inflation to output gap shock after IT (1993Q1)- Median of 
response of inflation to output gap shock before IT (1993Q1)< 0  
Y is the number of negatively signed observations (observation in this test corresponds to 
difference of the paired observations) 
Table 6: Wilcoxon-signed-rank test of the difference between inflation response 
to a unit shock coming to output-gap before and after adoption to of IT 
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